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The First Amendment and the Right To Hear
Urofsky v. Allen, 995 F. Supp. 634 (E.D. Va. 1998).
On July 1, 1996, Virginia enacted a statute that restricted state
employees' access to constitutionally protected speech.1 Under the new law,
Virginia employees could not use state computer equipment to access
sexually explicit material without express authorization from the head of a
state agency.2 In Urofsky v. Allen,3 the United States District Court for the
Eastern District of Virginia struck down the statute as an unconstitutional
abridgment of First Amendment rights.
On its face, Urofsky appears to be an important victory for those who
advocate liberal constructions of the freedom of speech. After all, the court
refused to be swayed by Virginia's argument that "state employee
computer use is not protected speech under the First Amendment because
the employees are acting in their capacities as government employees, not
public citizens." 4 It also rejected the argument that expressions of sexuality,
while protected under the First Amendment, "'are of such slight social
value... that any benefit that may be derived from them is clearly
outweighed by the social interest in order and morality."' 5 Instead, the
1. See VA. CODE ANN. §§ 2.1-804 to -806 (Michie Supp. 1998).
2. See id. § 2.1-805.
3. 995 F. Supp. 634 (E.D. Va. 1998).
4. I at 636 (quoting the defendant's trial memorandum). This argument was not without
precedential support. As Justice Holmes once stated, "There are few employments for hire in
which the servant does not agree to suspend his constitutional rights of free speech... by the
implied terms of his contract," McAuliffe v. Mayor of New Bedford, 29 N.E. 517, 517-18 (Mass.
1892), and recent Fourth Circuit decisions had adhered to this principle in allowing restrictions on
state employees' speech, see Boring v. Buncombe County Bd. of Educ., 136 F.3d 364 (4th Cir.
1998); DiMeglio v. Haines, 45 F.3d 790 (4th Cir. 1995). But see, e.g., Perry v. Sindermann, 408
U.S. 593, 597 (1972) (arguing that the government may not deny a person benefits "on a basis
that infringes his constitutionally protected interests-especially, his interest in freedom of
speech").
5. FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726,746 (1978) (quoting Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire,
315 U.S. 568,572 (1942)).
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court accorded full constitutional protection to sexually explicit materials
and condemned the statute as an impermissible restriction on the ability of
public employees to "speak on matters of public concern." 6
But the statute did not restrict this ability, at least not directly. What it
did restrict directly was the employees' ability to hear others speak on
matters of public concern. Unfortunately, the court failed to distinguish
between the First Amendment interest in producing speech and the First
Amendment interest in receiving speech, and as a result, its reasoning is
strained and ultimately unpersuasive. Furthermore, by failing to identify
properly the interest most directly at stake in the case before it, the court
lost the opportunity to protect this interest against future incursions that are
sure to come.
The facts presented in Urofsky were in little dispute. The Virginia
statute, entitled "Restrictions on State Employee Access to Information
Infrastructure," made it a criminal offense for any state employee to use
state-owned or state-leased computer equipment "to access, download,
print or store any information infrastructure files or services having
sexually explicit content" without first obtaining written approval! Under
the statute, such approval could be granted only by the heads of state
agencies and only "to the extent required in conjunction with a bona fide,
agency-approved research project or other agency-approved undertaking."'
Furthermore, the statute defined "sexually explicit content" to include any
description or visual representation of "a lewd exhibition of
nudity .... sexual excitement, [or] sexual conduct," and it defined
"information infrastructure" so broadly as to encompass all
"telecommunications, cable, and computer networks," including "the
Internet, the World Wide Web, Usenet, bulletin board systems, on-line
systems, and telephone networks." 9 So if Virginia employees wished to
view nudity on the Internet, receive sexual messages over e-mail, or even
discuss sexuality on office telephones," they had to justify their actions in
terms of official state business and obtain the permission of their employer.
6. Urofsky, 995 F. Supp. at 636.
7. VA. CODE ANN. § 2.1-805 (Michie Supp. 1998). Only employees of the Department of
State Police were exempted from this prohibition. See id. § 2.1-804. Thus, state agencies
prohibited from using or maintaining databases containing sexually explicit information included
Virginia's Departments of Corrections, Social Services, Juvenile Justice, and Mental Health, as
well as the Office of the Attorney General and the Library of Virginia. See Urofsky, 995 F. Supp.
at 638, 642.
8. VA. CODE ANN. § 2.1-805.
9. Id. § 2.1-804.
10. The statute apparently covered communications on standard office telephones that were
part of a computerized network. See Urofsky, 995 F. Supp. at 635 n.l.
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The Urofsky plaintiffs, a group of professors at Virginia state colleges
and universities, challenged the constitutionality of these restrictions. They
claimed that because the statute restricted their access to sexual materials, it
interfered with their research and teaching and thereby violated their First
Amendment rights." In response, the state argued that the statute's
restrictions were necessary to maintain efficiency in the public workplace
and to prevent the creation of sexually hostile work environments.12
To resolve this controversy, the district court analyzed the Virginia
statute as a direct restriction on state employees' freedom of speech. Using
a test that the Supreme Court established in Pickering v. Board of
Education,3 the court balanced the "'interests of the [employee] ... in
commenting upon matters of public concern"' against "'the interest of the
State, as employer, in promoting the efficiency of the public services it
performs."" 4 The court also considered "the public's interest in receiving
the speech of government employees." 5 While the court recognized the
validity of the government's interests in maintaining workplace efficiency
and preventing sexually hostile work environments, it found the statute
"both fatally overinclusive and underinclusive" as a method of furthering
those interests.16 Moreover, the court noted that Virginia employees were
already subject to content-neutral policies and statutes-that is, those that
did not single out expressive material on the basis of its content-that
addressed the state's concerns." In the court's view, the "obvious lack of fit
between the government's purported interest[s] and the sweep of its
restrictions,"' combined with the existence of these content-neutral
alternatives, cast "serious doubt" on the asserted need for the statute.' The
court therefore determined that the asserted governmental interests did not
outweigh the employees' interest in speaking and the public's interest in
hearing their speech. Accordingly, it granted summary judgment to the
plaintiffs and invalidated the statute in its entirety.
II. See id. at 635.
12. See id. at 639.
13. 391 U.S. 563 (1968).
14. Urofsky, 995 F. Supp. at 636 (quoting Pickering, 391 U.S. at 568).
15. Id at 637.
16. Id. at 639. As a method of furthering workplace efficiency, the court found the statute
overinclusive because it interfered with "countless work-related endeavors . . . dealing with
sexuality" and underinclusive because it targeted only sexual distractions. Id. at 640. As a method
of preventing sexually hostile work environments, the court found the statute overinclusive
because it restricted speech on matters such as sadomasochistic abuse and human rights violations
and underinclusive because, inter alia, it targeted only electronic communications. See id.
17. See id. at 643. For example, state policy already prohibited Virginia employees from
making "[ilnappropriate or unauthorized" use of state computers, and numerous content-neutral
federal laws penalize activities that may create or contribute to a hostile work environment. See id.
18. Id. at 639 (quotations and citations omitted).
19. Id. (quotations and citations omitted).
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Urofsky builds upon an extensive First Amendment doctrine relating to
speech in the government employment context. In a series of cases, the
Supreme Court has explored the extent to which the government may
restrict its employees' ability to engage in political activity,20 criticize
government policy," practice political patronage,22 and affiliate with
"subversive" political organizations.' It is from these cases that the
Urofsky court derived its standard for reviewing the Virginia statute. The
court relied heavily on Pickering, in which the Supreme Court granted
relief to a teacher who had been fired for publicly criticizing the Board of
Education that employed him.24 The Pickering Court balanced the teacher's
First Amendment interest in commenting upon matters of public concern
against the state's interest in furthering the efficiency of its services through
employee management.' Subsequently, in United States v. National
Treasury Employees Union26 (NTEU), which partially invalidated a statute
that prohibited government employees from accepting compensation for
speeches or articles, the Court broadened the Pickering test to account for
the fact that restrictions on government employee expression impinge upon
the public's interest in hearing this expression. 7 Drawing upon these cases,
the Urofsky court implemented what it referred to as "the Pickering/NTEU
test": "I[W]hen the government broadly restricts public employee speech, it
has the burden of establishing that 'the interests of both potential audiences
and a vast group of present and future employees in a broad range of
present and future expression are outweighed by that expression's
necessary impact on the actual operation of the Government."' "
But Urofsky differs from Pickering, NTEU, and other previous
government employment cases in a fundamental respect. Each of the
precedents involved a direct attempt by the government to prevent its
employees from engaging in a certain form of speech; in all of them, the
20. See, e.g., United States v. National Treasury Employees Union, 513 U.S. 454 (1995);
United States Civil Serv. Comm'n v. National Ass'n of Letter Carriers, 413 U.S. 548 (1973).
21. See, e.g., Rankin v. McPherson, 483 U.S. 378 (1987); Pickering v. Board of Educ., 391
U.S. 563 (1968).
22. See, e.g., Rutan v. Republican Party, 497 U.S. 62 (1990); Brand v. Finkel, 445 U.S. 507
(1980); Elrod v. Bums, 427 U.S. 347 (1976).
23. See, e.g., United States v. Robel, 389 U.S. 258 (1967); Elfbrandt v. Russell, 384 U.S. 11
(1966); Garner v. Board of Pub. Works, 341 U.S. 716 (1951).
24. See Pickering, 391 U.S. at 563.
25. See id. at 568. In Rankin, the Court used this same balancing test to analyze the claim of a
county employee who had been fired for an on-the-job comment. In so doing, the Court clarified
that this approach was proper regardless of whether the speech at issue occurred within or outside
of the workplace. See 483 U.S. at 383.
26. 513 U.S. 454 (1995).
27. See id. at 468.
28. Urofsky, 995 F. Supp. at 637 (quoting NTEU, 513 U.S. at 468).
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government penalized employees for speech that they themselves had
produced. In such situations, application of the Pickering/NTEU standard
makes sense. However, Urofsky did not involve a direct attempt by the
government to suppress its employees' speech. Rather, the censorship at
issue in Urofsky produced this suppressive effect only indirectly (i.e., by
denying employees access to materials about which they might speak).29
Rather than miscasting the Virginia statute solely as a threat to
government employees' right to produce speech, the Urofsky court should
have examined it primarily as a threat to their right to receive speech. No
court has ever explicitly addressed this latter interest in a government-
employment free speech case, a fact that may partially explain the Urofsky
court's oversight. To some extent, this has resulted from the nature of the
government restrictions that have heretofore arisen in the employment
context. However, there have been some cases that have clearly implicated
public employees' interests as listeners, most notably those involving
restrictions on the provision of information to military personnel.3
Interestingly, courts have chosen to analyze such restrictions under the
public forum doctrine, and the only First Amendment interests discussed in
these cases are those of the parties seeking to provide the information. Like
Urofsky, these cases have focused solely on government employees' right
to produce speech and ignored their right to receive it.
The right to receive speech, while constitutionally derivative of the
right to produce it,31 is distinct and possesses independent legal force. As
the Supreme Court has stated, "Freedom of speech presupposes a willing
speaker. But where a speaker exists .... the protection afforded is to the
communication, to its source and to its recipients both."3 Although it has
29. Indeed, proper analysis of the Virginia statute as a restriction of expressive activities
would require application of the O'Brien standard, which the Supreme Court has developed for
evaluating nonspeech restrictions that incidentally affect free speech. See United States v.
O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968). The Urofsky court may have avoided this form of analysis because
it realized, correctly, that the First Amendment issues at stake could not be captured fully within
it.
30. See, e.g., Greer v. Speck, 424 U.S. 828, 832 (1976) (upholding the military's refusal to
permit a presidential candidate to enter an army base to hold a meeting "to discuss election issues
with service personnel and their dependents"); General Media Communications v. Cohen, 131
F.3d 273 (2d Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 118 S. Ct. 2367 (1998) (upholding a statute that prohibited
the sale or rental of sexually explicit material on military property).
3 1. There are several paths to the conclusion that "freedom of speech necessarily protects the
right to receive." Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc.,
425 U.S. 748, 757 (1976) (quotations omitted). For instance, the receiver's right can be predicated
upon the free speech right of the speaker, the right to deliver a message lacks substance if the
government may prevent it from being heard. Cf. Martin v. City of Struthers, 319 U.S. 141, 143
(1943) ("This freedom embraces the right to distribute literature, and necessarily protects the right
to receive it."). Alternatively, the receiver's right can be predicated upon his or her own right of
free speech; one cannot participate in "the uninhibited, robust, and wide-open debate and
discussion that are contemplated by the First Amendment" if one cannot access information to
debate and discuss. Lamont v. Postmaster Gen., 381 U.S. 301, 307 (1965) (citation omitted).
32. Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 756.
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long been established that the right to receive speech possesses independent
constitutional status,33 this right has only recently begun to assume a central
role in the Court's First Amendment jurisprudence. The emergence-or
more accurately, the reemergence-of this right has been particularly
striking in the television regulation context, where the Court has repeatedly
emphasized the importance of providing "the widest possible dissemination
of information from diverse and antagonistic sources." ' While the Justices
have yet to discuss this right in the government employment context, it
would be inconsistent for it not to exist there as well?5
Had the Urofsky court followed the Supreme Court's lead and framed
the Virginia statute as a restriction on public employees' right to receive
speech, its analysis would have taken on a fundamentally different
character. To be sure, the court still could have employed a balancing
approach,36 but the nature of the First Amendment interests considered, and
the methodology for evaluating burdens on those interests, would have been
substantially different. To evaluate the statute's First Amendment
implications from this perspective, a court would examine the extent to
which the statute burdened the state employees' right to access the speech
of others. In making this examination, a court would need to inquire into
33. See, e.g., Kleindeinst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753, 762 (1972) (" 'It is now well established
that the Constitution protects the right to receive information and ideas."') (quoting Stanley v.
Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 564 (1969)).
34. Turner Broad. Sys. v. FCC, 117 S. Ct. 1174, 1204 (1997) [Turner 11] (Breyer, J.,
concurring) (quoting Turner Broad. Sys. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 663 (1994) [Turner 1]); accord
Arkansas Educ. Television Comm'n v. Forbes, 118 S. Ct. 1633, 1640 (1998); Denver Area Educ.
Telecomms. Consortium v. FCC, 518 U.S. 727, 753-60 (1996); Red Lion Broad. Co. v. FCC, 395
U.S. 367, 390 (1969).
35. This is not to say that restrictions on public employees' right to hear should be scrutinized
in the same manner as analogous restrictions imposed on ordinary citizens. Quite the contrary:
The claim that the government as employer may impose more restrictions than the government as
sovereign, see, e.g., Pickering v. Board of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 568 (1968), retains its validity in
the right-to-hear context. Thus, while strict scrutiny would be appropriate if the government
imposed content-based restrictions on the citizenry's ability to access information, see Turner II,
117 S. Ct. at 1208 (O'Connor, J., dissenting), a more flexible approach is required in government
employment cases, see infra note 36 and accompanying text.
36. There was some argument in Urofsky as to whether the balancing test was indeed
appropriate, given the content-discriminatory nature of the Virginia statute. In most
circumstances, content-based restrictions must withstand strict scrutiny in order to survive. See,
e.g., Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. Members of the N.Y. State Crime Victims Bd., 502 U.S. 105, 116-
18 (1991). However, the Urofsky court decided to apply a less stringent standard of review
because it believed that under Board of County Conm'rs v. Umbehr, 518 U.S. 668 (1996), "the
government may take actions as an employer that are forbidden to it as a sovereign." Urofsky, 995
F. Supp. at 638 (citing Umbehr, 518 U.S. at 678). But as the court itself realized, "the application
of Umbehr to the [Virginia statute] is limited" because Umbehr involved an adverse action
against an individual speaker, not "a content-based prior restraint affecting thousands of
government employees." Id. It should also be noted that, whereas Umbehr involved the
government in its role as a contractor, Urofsky involved the government in its role as an educator,
and content-based speech restrictions are particularly pernicious in the education context. See
Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Community Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 506, 514 (1969); Shelton v.
Tucker, 364 U.S. 479, 487 (1960). Thus, there is at least a plausible argument that the correct
standard for analyzing the Virginia statute is strict scrutiny.
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such factors as the degree to which state employees use the Internet for
informational purposes and the availability of alternative information
sources. Only through such inquiries could a court determine the burden the
statute placed on employees' First Amendment access rights. It could then
go on to explore the extent to which this burden in turn restricted other
constitutional rights, including those recognized in Urofsky. For the point is
not that the statute's impact on employee speech interests is irrelevant, but
that it is secondary. Just as the public's interest in hearing speech is only
implicated to the extent that the statute restricts the employees' ability to
speak, the employees' ability to speak is only implicated to the extent that
the statute restricts their access to information and ideas.
Framing the Virginia statute properly-as a restriction on the right to
receive speech--does not alter Urofsky's bottom-line result. The Internet,
as the court noted, is "arguably the most powerful tool for sharing
information ever developed," 37 and the record in Urofsky made clear that
state employees regularly access the Internet's "sexually explicit" content
over state computer systems for a variety of professional, personal, and
pedagogical reasons.38 In addition, the statute prohibited employees not
only from accessing sexual material on the Internet, but also from receiving
it through e-mail and local database networks.39 Undoubtedly, many state
employees depend upon their employment for access to all of these
information technologies. The Virginia statute therefore substantially
impaired their ability to access vast quantities of information that they
could not easily obtain from alternative sources. Neither of the
governmental interests advanced in support of the statute can justify such a
severe contravention of the employees' First Amendment rights. While
furthering operational efficiency and preventing the development of hostile
workplaces are valid goals, the statute is, as the court correctly observed,
"both fatally overinclusive and underinclusive" as a means of attaining
them.' Thus, the court was right to strike the statute down as a violation of
the First Amendment; it merely erred in its methodology.
The short-term cost of this error appears minimal. Although the court's
analysis was disjointed-an uneasy amalgam of precedent, reasoning, and
facts-its ultimate decision to invalidate the statute appears correct. But the
long-term cost could well be much greater. In disregarding the primary
constitutional right at stake, the court failed to produce a principled basis
for defending that right against the Virginia statute's threat and against the
future threats that almost certainly will arise.
37. Urofsky, 995 F. Supp. at 638 (citing Reno v. ACLU, 117 S. Ct. 2329,2335 (1997)).
38. See Urofsky, 995 F. Supp. at 639-42.
39. See supra notes 9-10 and accompanying text.
40. Urofsky, 995 F. Supp. at 639.
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The right to receive speech is likely to be increasingly threatened as a
result of several emerging sociopolitical trends. First, information
technologies are becoming the primary vehicles of public discourse, and the
citizen's ability to access them is therefore assuming a greater constitutional
dimension.41 Furthermore, as these technologies have replaced more
individualized methods of communication, the information sources upon
which citizens rely have become increasingly concentrated. This, in turn,
has increased the likelihood that government regulations will impair public
access to information; the more concentrated the sources of information
become, the more likely it is that the regulation of an individual source will
significantly impair the citizen's ability to receive speech and ideas. At the
same time that information technologies are assuming increasing
constitutional significance and consolidating the flow of information to the
public, both state and federal governments are becoming increasingly active
in their efforts to regulate these technologies.42 Thus, it seems inevitable
that future governmental actions will intrude upon the right to receive
speech. By failing to recognize the importance of this right, the Urofsky
court left it vulnerable to such future intrusions.
Because the court failed to appreciate fully the novelty of the issue
before it, what could have been a watershed case may well end up as a
minor footnote in the history of First Amendment jurisprudence. The
Urofsky court could have been the first to state explicitly that the right to
receive speech has reemerged as a central component of constitutional law.
It could have been the first to examine this right as it applies to public
employees. And it could have been the first to establish the importance of
this right in the Internet context. But it was not. Instead, the court's
decision, while correct in the narrow sense, failed to address the central
issue that underlay the case.
-Dana R. Wagner
41. See, e.g., Andre R. Barry, Balancing Away the Freedom of Speech: Turner Broadcasting
System v. FCC, 21 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 272 (1997) (objecting to this doctrinal trend); Cass
R. Sunstein, The First Amendment in Cyberspace, 104 YALE L.J. 1757, 1798-99 (1995); Owen M.
Fiss, The Censorship of Television (Nov. 3, 1998) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author).
Whereas the right to receive was originally explored as it applied to such traditional forms of
speech as literature distribution, see Martin v. City of Struthers, 319 U.S. 141, 143 (1943); Lovell
v. City of Griffin, 303 U.S. 444, 452 (1938), and interpersonal communication, see Thomas v.
Collins, 323 U.S. 516 (1945), these forms of speech have in many respects been superseded by
television, radio, and computer technology as methods of information exchange, cf Owen M. Fiss,
Free Speech and Social Structure, 71 IowA L. REV. 1405, 1408-13 (1986) (making a similar
observation); Sunstein, supra, at 1792-94 (same). Arguably, the greater the role a technology
plays in the public discourse, the more its regulation implicates First Amendment concerns.
42. The Virginia statute is just one example of this recent trend. Other examples include the
Child Online Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 105-775 (Oct. 22, 1998), the Telecommunications Act of
1996, 110 Stat. 56 (to be codified in scattered sections of 47 U.S.C.), the Cable Television
Consumer Protection and Competition Act of 1992, 106 Stat. 1460 (codified in scattered sections
of 47 U.S.C.), and the Television Program Improvement Act of 1990,47 U.S.C. § 303c (1994).
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